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In Memoriam
An Indispensable Man
THOMAS MORAWETZ
Phillip I. Blumberg served as Dean of the University of Connecticut School of
Law from 1974 to 1984. These remarks were first delivered at the University of
Connecticut School of Law’s tribute to Dean Blumberg, “Honoring Phillip I.
Blumberg,” held on December 10, 2021. They have been lightly edited for publication.
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An Indispensable Man
THOMAS MORAWETZ *
When I speak with friends who know nothing about the history of our
law school, my shorthand for referring to Phillip Blumberg and his tenure
as Dean is to say that he is the George Washington of the University of
Connecticut School of Law. No, he was not our first dean, nor did he fight
an extended battle for national independence. But, for those of us who knew
him as Dean and éminence grise after his term ended, his name and person
are symbols of the aspirations and values of the institution, and indeed of
its identity.
****
I joined the faculty of the law school in the fall of 1977, having been hired
during the previous academic year as one of five tenure-track members who
joined in that year. Especially in the early years of his deanship, which
extended from 1974 to 1984, Phillip was committed to expanding the faculty
with transformative hires. Even though his own professional accomplishments
had been and continued to be in corporate law, he was especially attentive to
the burgeoning identity of the school as a center for interdisciplinary studies
with a strong focus on humanities and social sciences.
I came to the law school after teaching as an assistant professor, then an
associate professor, of philosophy at Yale. I was mindful of the fact that I
was reconfiguring my career at a time when Phillip was reconfiguring the
law school. My prior educational and teaching experiences had been at
schools whose nature and standing had been well-defined for centuries,
schools unlikely to be redefined by the ambitions and vision of a new leader.
But it was just such a redefinition in which many of my new colleagues were
engaged, clearly inspired and spearheaded by Phillip.
My transition was thrilling, but not easy. Psychologists tell us that
“imposter syndrome” is a common neurosis. It was hard to avoid a form of
it as I became a philosophy teacher posing as a law professor. I convinced
myself and my students fairly quickly that the distinction between the
philosophical and legal pedagogies was illusory and that both vocations
involved posing questions of theory and doctrine, in conversations rich with
hypotheticals, to refine ever clearer strategies of reasoning. But the feeling
of being an imposter has never completely vanished, and I suspect some of
my colleagues continue to see my posing as a law professor as a masquerade.
*

Tapping Reeve Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Connecticut School of Law.
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Phillip quickly made me feel at home at the law school. Three different
examples illustrate how he assured me of my distinctive place in its
community. The first was that Phillip, who was living alone in the years
before his marriage to Connecticut Chief Justice Ellen Ash Peters, invited
small groups of faculty members to his apartment every few weeks for
informal evening discussions. Over sherry, tea, and biscuits, we addressed
how legal strategies might answer pressing social and cultural issues. We
prepared by reading short articles on topics selected in advance. Phillip was
careful to mix the newest and youngest with more venerable colleagues,
effectively eroding hierarchic inhibitions. He was careful, as well, to meld
the casual informality of after-dinner conversation with the subliminal sense
that we were expected to demonstrate the acuity that he knew we had.
A second example involved outreach beyond the law school. A year
after I joined the faculty, Phillip asked me whether I was interested in leading
a monthly discussion of seminal texts and writers in legal philosophy with a
group of Connecticut judges, mostly from the Connecticut Appellate Court.
A couple of judges had expressed to Phillip their envy of scholars who had
the freedom to satisfy their curiosity about legal theory without a judge’s
time and case constraints. For the next two and a half years, I met with an
evolving group of judges for free-wheeling talk about philosophy before and
after dinner once a month during the academic year. Having taught legal
philosophy for about ten years at that point in my career—to undergraduate,
graduate, and law students—I had questions and doubts about the concrete
usefulness of legal philosophy in the daily work of judges. The participants
in these discussions had no such doubts. In sum, the memory of these
meetings remains, for me, a most positive affirmation of the value of what
we do.
A third example has unique personal resonance. During my first seven
years at the school, my mother, who was widowed and living in Oak Park,
Illinois, visited me once a year for a week or two. During two such visits, I
had the chance to introduce her and Phillip, and he promptly invited us to
lunch at the Hartford Club. On these occasions, she spoke about her
background as a refugee from Vienna and about her training as a concert
pianist, and she and Phillip seemed to engage warmly. In the summer of
1983, she passed away from a rapidly developing case of pancreatic cancer.
That fall, Phillip proposed that the school organize a chamber music concert
in celebration of her memory. He noted that one of our newest faculty
members, Steve Utz, was an accomplished pianist, that one of our senior
colleagues, Cliff Davis, was adept on the clarinet, and that one of our
first-year students was first violinist in the New Haven Symphony. After a
few months of rehearsal, they gave a wonderful, very well-attended, and
well-received performance. Objectively, it was a grand success, and,
subjectively, it was one of the most moving experiences of my life. It showed
Phillip’s remarkable qualities of empathy, imagination, and enterprise.
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****
No one has ever referred to Phillip as a Teddy bear or as warm and
cuddly. His dapper and diminutive presence was hardly ursine, Teddy or
otherwise, and his demeanor was widely seen as intimidating—intimidating
because he easily telegraphed high expectations and an impatience to get
things done. The adage about “not suffering fools gladly” could have been
coined for Phillip. At the same time, it was manageable to satisfy his
expectations, and, when you had done so, he was gracious and kind in letting
you know.
His impatience produced a singular, and singularly successful, style of
administration—of “deaning”—which is notably at odds with contemporary
conventions of governance in academia. For one thing, it is now widely seen
as imperative to do strategic planning and to devise “five-year plans,” a
phrase that may stir up disturbing twentieth-century precedents. These
strategic plans typically include expressions of adherence to excellence,
rather than mediocrity; to the demands of the future, rather than the practices
of the past; and so on. Phillip emphatically regarded the task of refining such
abstract and general pronouncements as unnecessary and distracting gestures.
He was similarly skeptical of committees, hardly dissenting from the
venerable joke about a camel being a horse put together by a committee. He
developed and assigned tasks, for the most part, through one-on-one
conversations with faculty and staff members, and he implicitly made clear
his expectation that the task be accomplished expeditiously, if not
(preferably) “by yesterday.” He trusted individuals more than groups to
solve problems and he believed more in individual expertise and efficiency
than in trying to meld different points of view and sort conflicting agendas.
Yet another difference of content, as well as style, was implicit in his
attitude to our standing vis-à-vis other law schools. It is now a familiar
practice to assess successes and failures, progress and regress, by comparing
our school with “peer schools,” meaning law schools of similar rank,
demography, size, and so on. For Phillip, doing so flew in the face of what
he regarded as a genuine kind of exceptionalism on our part. His conviction,
often shared, was that each school—or at least our school—had its own
destiny and its own trajectory, measured in our situation by interdisciplinary
strength. For him, the “peer schools” to consider were those considered
exemplary in their high standing, schools to be examined to see what lessons
we could learn and what strategies we could borrow—schools such as
Stanford, Yale, and Harvard.
Phillip’s infectious style of leadership was idiosyncratic. The peremptory
aspects of his style would have been damaging if there had not been
appreciation of his single-minded concern for the school’s well-being and
widespread respect for his genius at bringing about congruent results. In
speaking of someone hyperbolically as a “benign dictator,” it matters whether
the emphasis is, as it was with Phillip, on “benign.”
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****
It will be apparent that Phillip led the school at a time of high
aspirations. Our national ranking was as high as it has ever been, and there
was strong evidence of the school’s growing national reputation. It was,
nationally and locally, a period of optimism and apparent upward mobility.
But nearly forty years have passed since the hopefulness of the post-Nixon
years, and, like all periods, they have involved unforeseeable vicissitudes.
When I studied the philosophy of history in graduate school, I ran into
debates about the so-called “great man” theory of history, perhaps better
called the “great person” theory. A well-established and perennial notion of
history, more common among lay observers than professional historians,
reduces history to the accomplishments of great figures, from Julius Caesar
to Elizabeth I to Nelson Mandela. Among scholars of history, the great
person theory is often debunked; the view is that history is to be understood
through social, political, and economic movements, that great figures are
merely the manifestations and agents of historical development and change.
The fascination with this debate, as with almost all persistent academic
debates, is that it is unresolvable, that there are compelling arguments on
every side yielding many kinds of illumination. When we focus not on
grand history, but on local history, even on the history of our law school,
some of the same questions arise. Are leaders simply a manifestation or
product of their times, or do they transcend their times?
I resist the view that Phillip Blumberg was simply the right person in
the right job at the right time. While that is surely true, I would add that, for
those of us who had the luck and pleasure to work with him both during his
tenure as dean and during his subsequent thirty years as a vital presence at
UConn Law, his legacy is still part of our DNA. He gave the school a
durable identity and set of academic values. He made possible the notion
that it was more than just another good or improving or aspiring law school;
it was a place where interdisciplinary accomplishments distinguished us
and made our collective contribution special. But identities can be fragile.
Institutions, like individuals, age; they reconstitute themselves through
hires and departures. Nonetheless, for many of us, Phillip’s vision remains
relevant and robust. As we face challenges in the evolution of the legal
profession, academia, and the world at large, we continue to ask, “What
would Phillip do?”

